Strategic Deception in the Second World War

There are four essential accounts of deception in World War II: this is one of them. The other three are Michael I. Handel (editor), "Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War;" Anthony Cave Brown's best-selling history, "Bodyguard of Lies;" and Colonel David Glantz's definitive, "Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War." What distinguishes these volumes from deception accounts is their analysis of the deception process. That is, they go beyond simply detailing deception history to explain how deception planners adjusted and adapted their gambits throughout the war based on their successes and failures in fooling their Nazi enemy. Basically, the Americans and British succeeded in convincing the Nazis throughout the war that they were far stronger than they truly were, while the Russians continually fooled the Nazis into thinking they were far weaker than was the fact. Publication of Howard's official WWII deception history was held up for a decade by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who, according the M.R.D. Foot, "saw no reason to explain to potential enemies how Britain might fight them." Once (now) Lady Thatcher left office, the deception history was published. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Howard's history is its account of deception's deep roots in British tradition. Both Professor Handel and Sir Michael credit General Edmund Allenby in the First World War with laying the groundwork for the remarkably successful strategic deceptions of the Second World War. Handel wrote "For Allenby, unlike almost every other general of the Great War, [deception] plans were a key element of every operational plan. As T.E Lawrence [i.e., "Lawrence of Arabia;" Colonel Lawrence's Arab Desert Strike Force executed many of Allenby's deceptive stratagems] remarked, 'Deceptions, which for the ordinary general were just witty hors d'oeuvres before battle, had become for Allenby a main point in strategy.'...Allenby's ... operations closely resembled the more complex schemes devised during the Second World War." Howard notes that Allenby's deception staff in WWI included General Archibald Wavell, who in World War II used Allenby's methods successfully against the Italians and Germans in the Western Desert, at one point defeating 250,000 of the enemy with a British force of only 50,000. General Wavell and his deception planner, Brigadier Dudley Clarke, recommended these methods, leading to establishment of the London Controlling Section (LCS), the Allied D-day deceivers. Allenby is truly the father of the 20th century grand military deception.