Attack on Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor (called the Hawaii Operation or Operation Z by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and the Battle of Pearl Harbor by some Americans)^[1] was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941. The next day the United States declared war on Japan resulting in their entry into World War II. The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from influencing the war that the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia, against Britain and the Netherlands, as well as the U.S. in the Philippines. The base was attacked by Japanese aircraft (a total of 353, in two waves) launched from six aircraft carriers.^[2]

Four U.S. Navy battleships were sunk (two of which were raised and returned to service later in the war) and all of the four other battleships present were damaged. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship^[3] and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, 2,402 personnel were killed^[4] and 1,282 were wounded. The power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light, with 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 65 servicemen killed or wounded. One Japanese sailor was captured.

The attack was a major engagement of World War II and came as a profound shock to the American people. Domestic support for isolationism, which had been strong, disappeared. Germany's ill-considered declaration of war on the U.S., which was not required by any treaty commitment, moved the U.S. from clandestine support of Britain (for example the Neutrality Patrol) into active alliance and full participation in the European Theater. Despite numerous historical precedents for unannounced military action, the lack of any formal warning by Japan, particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led to President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaiming December 7 "a date which will live in infamy".

Background to conflict

Anticipating war

The naval strike was intended to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and hence protect Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where Japan sought access to natural resources such as oil and rubber. Both the U.S. and Japan held long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific which were continuously updated as tensions between the two countries steadily increased during the 1930s, with the Japanese expanding into Manchuria and mainland China. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China and achieve sufficient resource independence to attain victory on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these efforts.^[5]

In 1940, following Japan's invasion of French Indochina and under the authority granted by the Export Control Act, the United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline, which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act. After it was announced in September iron and steel scrap export would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 warning this might be considered an "unfriendly act".^[6] The U.S. did not stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil,^[7][8] and likely to be considered a provocation by Japan.

Japanese planning staff studied the 1940 British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively. It was of great use to them when planning their attack on U.S. naval forces in Pearl Harbor. A torpedo bomber needed a long, level flight, and when released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep before swerving upward to strike a hull. Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a break-away "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."^[9]

Following Japanese expansion into French Indochina after the fall of France, the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.^[10] President Franklin D. Roosevelt had earlier moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii and ordered a military buildup in the Philippines in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly)^[11] certain any attack on the British Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into the war,^[11] a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way^[11] to avoid U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the Philippines was also considered to be necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan Orange had envisioned defending the Philippines with a 40,000 man elite force. However, this was opposed by Douglas MacArthur, who felt that he would need a force ten times that size, and was never implemented.^[12] By 1941, U.S. planners anticipated abandonment of the Philippines at the outbreak of war and orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet.^[13]

War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency plans for) since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow seriously until Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand into China, leading to all-out war in 1937. In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to control supplies reaching China, and as a first step to improve her access to resources in Southeast Asia. This move prompted an American embargo on oil exports to Japan, which in turn caused the Japanese to initiate their planned takeover of oil production in the Dutch East Indies.^[14] Furthermore, the transfer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet from its previous base in San Diego to its new base in Pearl Harbor was seen by the Japanese military as a preparation for conflict.

Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet.^[15] He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.^[16] Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Captain Minoru Genda{. Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence collected. Despite these preparations, the attack plan was not approved by Emperor Hirohito until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.^[17] Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."^[18]

Though by late 1941 many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent, and U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on multiple occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target. They expected the Philippines to be attacked first, due to the threat bases there would pose to sea lanes, hence supplies to and from territory to the south,^[19] which were Japan's main objective.^[5] They also believed (wrongly) that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.^[20]

Objectives

The attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory.^[21][22] Finally, it was meant to deliver a severe blow to American morale, one which would discourage Americans from committing to a war extending into the western Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies. To maximize the effect on morale, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. The overall intention was to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference.^[21]

Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (USS Enterprise (CV-6), USS Lexington (CV-2), and USS Saratoga (CV-3)). Ironically, the IJN top command was so imbued with Admiral Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine—especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships—that, despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.

Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, could safely be ignored, since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.^[23]

Approach and attack

On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku) departed northern Japan en route to a position to northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor. In all, 408 aircraft were intended to be used: 360 for the two attack waves, 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.

The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to finish whatever tasks remained. The first wave contained the bulk of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water.^[24] The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if either were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). Dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to counterattack the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over US airfields.

Before the attack commenced, two reconnaissance aircraft launched from cruisers were sent to scout over Oahu and report on enemy fleet composition and location. Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the Kido Butai) and Niihau, in order to prevent the task force from being caught by a surprise counterattack.^[25]

Submarines

Fleet submarines I.16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu.^[26] The five I-boats left Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941,^[27] coming to 10 nm (19 km) off the mouth of Pearl Harbor^[28] and launched their charges, at about 01:00 December 7.^[29] At 03:42^[30] Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor (AMc-14) spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer USS Ward (DD-139).^[31] The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However; Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37^[31]{{#Tag:Ref|She was located by a University of Hawaii research submersible on August 28, 2002 in 400 meters of water, five miles outside the harbor.^[32] in the first American shots fired in World War II. A midget on the north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4) with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan (DD-354) with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.^[31]

A third midget submarine grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.^[33] Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. A fourth had been damaged by a depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.^[34] A United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack conducted in 1999 indicated a midget may have successfully fired a torpedo into USS West Virginia (BB-48). Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 December 8 claiming damage to one or more large war vessels inside Pearl Harbor.^[35] The submarine's final disposition has been unknown,^[36] but she did not return to her "mother" sub.^[37] On December 7, 2009 the Los Angeles Times reported that there is circumstantial evidence that three pieces of a submarine discovered three miles south of Pearl Harbor between 1994 and 2001 could be that of the missing submarine. The publication also reported that there is strong circumstantial evidence that the submarine fired two torpedoes at Battleship Row. The debris was dumped outside the harbor as part of an effort to conceal the West Loch Disaster, a 1944 ammunition explosion that destroyed six tank landing ships preparing for the secret invasion of Saipan.^[38]

Japanese declaration of war

The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.^[39][40] The Japanese tried to uphold the conventions of war while still achieving surprise, but the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5,000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese Ambassador to deliver it in time. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.)^[41] The final part of the "14-Part Message" is sometimes described as a declaration of war, but in fact it "neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations".^[42] A declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8,^[43] but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document to Washington hinting at war. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... [a]nd they clearly prevailed."^[44]

First wave composition

The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It included:{{#Tag:Ref|The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.^[45]|group=nb}}

• 1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)^[46]
  • 50 Nakajima B5N bombers armed with 800 kilogram (1760 pound) armor piercing bombs, organized in four sections
  • 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections
• 2nd Group — (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
  • 54 Aichi D3A dive bombers armed with 550 pound general purpose bombs
• 3rd Group — (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe)
  • 45 Mitsubishi A6M fighters for air control and strafing^[45]

Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.^[25]

As the first wave approached Oahu a U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip (a post not yet operational, having been in training mode for months) detected them and called in a warning. Although the operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard,^[47] reported a target, a newly-assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the source. The direction from which the aircraft were coming was close (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses),^[48] while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar;^[49] they neglected to tell Tyler of its size,^[50] while Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell them the B-17s were due^[50] (even though it was widely known).^[50]

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land, and one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already attacked at Pearl and specific orders to commence operations before they actually struck his command.

The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai ), with the attack on Kaneohe.^[51] A total of 353^[2] Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Force fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6).{{#Tag:Ref|In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.|group=nb}}

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men into dressing as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to deter sabotage,^[52] guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).^[52] Despite this low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the battle. Ensign Joe Taussig, Jr., the only commissioned officer aboard USS Nevada (BB-36), got the ship underway during the attack but lost a leg. The ship was beached in the harbor by the Senior Quartermaster.^[53] One of the destroyers, USS Aylwin (DD-355), got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding BB-48USS West Virginia (BB-48) (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit USS Tennessee (BB-43), moored alongside.

Second wave composition

The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki.^[45] Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.^[25] This wave and its targets comprised:^[45]

• 1st Group — 54 B5Ns armed with 550 pound and 132 pound general purpose bombs^[46]
  • 27 B5Ns — aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
  • 27 B5Ns — hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
  • 81 D3As armed with 550 pound general purpose bombs, in four sections
• 3rd Group — (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe)
  • 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing

The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kaneohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.^[54]|group=nb}}^[55]

Of the American fatalities, nearly half of the total were due to the explosion of Arizona's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16 in.) shell.

Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs, and she was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance.

California (BB-44) was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser USS Helena (CL-50) was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer USS Oglala (CM-4). Two destroyers in dry dock, USS Cassin (DD-372) and USS Downes (DD-375) were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes . The light cruiser USS Raleigh (CL-7) was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser USS Honolulu (CL-48) was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel USS Vestal (AR-4), moored alongside Arizona , was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4) was also damaged. The destroyer USS Shaw (DD-373) was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.^[56]

Of the 402^[2] American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged,^[2] 155 of them on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Friendly fire brought down some U.S. planes on top of that, including five from an inbound flight from Enterprise (CV-6). Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414^[45] available planes, 29 were lost during the battle^[57] (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

Possible third wave

Several Japanese junior officers, including Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda, the chief architect of the attack, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo{{#Tag:Ref|In the event, loss of these might have been a net benefit to the U.S. Blair, passim .|group=nb}} storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible.^[58] Military historians have suggested the destruction of these would have hampered the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships.^[59] If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";^[60] according to American Admiral Chester Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years."^[61] Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:

• American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.^[62] Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.^[62]
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the Admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.^[62] Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.^[63]
• A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.^[64]
• The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.^[65]
• He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission — the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet — and did not wish to risk further losses.^[66] Moreover, it was Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.^[67]

At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo.^[66] In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.^[68]

Notes

1. ↑ Fukudome, Shigeru, "Hawaii Operation". United States Naval Institute, Proceedings , 81 (December 1955), pp.1315-1331
2. ↑ ^{a b c d} {{Harvnb|Parillo|2006|p=288}}
3. ↑ USS Utah (AG-16, formerly BB-31)
4. ↑ Full Pearl Harbor casualty list
5. ↑ ^{a b} {{Harvnb|Barnhart|1987}}.
6. ↑ {{Harvnb|GPO|1943|p=96|Ref=CITEREFGPO1943a}}
7. ↑ {{Harvnb|GPO|1943|p=94|Ref=CITEREFGPO1943a}}
8. ↑ Toland, Japan's War .
9. ↑ Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II. By Robert Gannon Published by Penn State Press, 1996, page 49. ISBN 0-271-01508-X
10. ↑ {{Harvnb|GPO|1943|p=125|Ref=CITEREFGPO1943a}}
11. ↑ ^{a b c}
12. ↑ {{Citation|author=William Chalek|title=Guest of the Emperor|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=30KUgALzEF8C|year=2002|publisher=iUniverse|isbn=9780595239962|chapter-url=http://books.google.com/books?id=30KUgALzEF8C&pg=PA45|chapter=8. War Plan Orange|pages=45–52}}
13. ↑ {{Citation|author=Edward S. Miller|title=War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=uZ0Bw4c8vKwC|year=2007|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=9781591145004|pages=63}}
14. ↑ {{Harvnb|Peattie|1997}}; Coox, Kobun .
15. ↑ {{Harvnb|Gailey|1995|p=68}}
16. ↑ {{Harvnb|Gailey|1995|p=70}}
17. ↑ {{Harvnb|Wetzler|1998|p=39}}.
18. ↑ {{Harvnb|Bix|2000|p=417}}, citing the Sugiyama memo
19. ↑ Noted by Arthur MacArthur in the 1890s. Manchester, William. American Caesar
20. ↑ Peattie & Evans, Kaigun
21. ↑ ^{a b} Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin , p.14.
22. ↑ Fukudome, Shigeru. Shikan: Shinjuwan Kogeki (Tokyo, 1955), p.150.
23. ↑ Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin
24. ↑ {{Harvnb|Peattie|2001}} p. 145.
25. ↑ ^{a b c} Order of Battle - Pearl Harbor - December 7, 1941
26. ↑ Stewart, A.J., Lieutenant Commander, USN. "Those Mysterious Midgets", United States Naval Institute Proceedings , December 1974, p.56
27. ↑ Stewart, p.56
28. ↑ {{Harvnb|Goldstein|Dillon|2000|p=146}}
29. ↑ Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.57
30. ↑ {{Harvnb|Smith|1999|p=36}}
31. ↑ ^{a b c} Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.58
32. ↑ {{Cite web|url=http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/midget.html|title= Japanese Midget Submarine|accessdate=2008-09-07 }}
33. ↑ Stewart, pp.59-61
34. ↑ Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.61-2
35. ↑ Ofstie, R.A., Rear Admiral, USN. The Campaigns of the Pacific War (United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p.19
36. ↑ {{Harvnb|Rodgaard|1999}}
37. ↑ {{Citation |author=Mochitsura Hashimoto |title=Sunk |year=1954 |page=31 }}
38. ↑ Pearl Harbor mini-submarine mystery solved? Researchers think they have found the remains of a Japanese mini-submarine that probably fired on U.S. battleships on Dec. 7, 1941 Los Angeles Times December 7, 2009
39. ↑ {{Harvnb|Hixson|2003|p=73}}.
40. ↑ Calvocoressi et al. , The Penguin History of the Second World War , p.952
41. ↑ Toland, Infamy
42. ↑ {{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p=58}}
43. ↑ [http://www.wpunj.edu/irt/courses/hist365/declarewar.htm Declaration of War handout
44. ↑ {{Cite news|url=http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html?pagewanted=1 |title=Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show |author=Howard W. French |publisher=The New York Times |date=December 9, 1999}}
45. ↑ ^{a b c d e} AIRCRAFT ATTACK ORGANIZATION
46. ↑ ^{a b} {{Harvnb|NavSource|2003}}
47. ↑ The American Century, Harold Evans,Jonathan Cape, London,1998 p.309
48. ↑ {{Harvnb|Prange|1999|p=98}}
49. ↑ Prange et al. , At Dawn We Slept , p.500.
50. ↑ ^{a b c} Prange et al. , At Dawn We Slept , p.501.
51. ↑ {{Harvnb|Prange|1999|p=174}}
52. ↑ ^{a b} {{Harvnb|Parillo|2006|p=293}}
53. ↑ Final Voyages, by Kermit Bonner.
54. ↑ {{Harvnb|Conn|2000|p=194}}
55. ↑ {{Harvnb|GPO|1946|pp=64–65|Ref=CITEREFGPO1946a}}
56. ↑ {{Harvnb|USS Shaw (DD-373)|Ref=CITEREFdanfs373}}
57. ↑ {{Harvnb|Ofstie|1946|p=18}}
58. ↑ {{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=68}}
59. ↑ Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin ; Blair, Silent Victory .
60. ↑ {{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|pp=97–98}}
61. ↑ {{Citation|last=Yergin|first=Daniel|title=The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power|publisher=Simon & Schuster|location=New York|year=1991|isbn=0-671-79932-0|accessdate=31 July 2009}} p. 327
62. ↑ ^{a b c} {{Harvnb|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
63. ↑ {{Harvnb|Hoyt|2000|p=191}}
64. ↑ {{Citation | last = Stephen | first = Martin | title = Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2 | location = Shepperton, Surrey | publisher = Ian Allan | year = 1988 | pages = 34–38 | volume = Volume 1 | isbn = 0711015961 | coauthors = Grove, Eric (Ed)}}
65. ↑ {{Harvnb|Prange|1999}}
66. ↑ ^{a b} {{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=97}}
67. ↑ Willmott, p.16.
68. ↑ {{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=98}}