Hart Investigation - Day 41

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1944 FORTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2: 15 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel. Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fortieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination. No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

46. Q. I hand you a dispatch from CNO under date of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this record. Do you recall the background of this dispatch, whether it was based upon the Navy's own estimate or on advice by the State Department, and so forth? A. As the dispatch indicates, the reason for sending this dispatch was in the dispatch itself which refers to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval task forces. I do not recall any specific thing in Washington which prompted this dispatch except that it probably was an estimate based on all information, diplomatic and otherwise, that we had at the moment.

47. Q. This dispatch advises the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific that an aggressive move in the Western Pacific is indicated. The preceding dispatch, of 24 November, warned against an aggressive movement in any direction. Can you throw any light upon what led to the change in the information given to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific? A. The only reason that I can give now is that the character of the landing craft which were referred to in the dispatch of November 27 were such that they could not have been used other than in the Far Eastern area.

48. Q. What do you recall in the way of discussions at about this period in the offices of the CNO as to the possibility or even probability of a surprise air raid upon Pearl Harbor?

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A. I do not recall any discussions in the latter part of November or early December regarding the probability of an air raid on Hawaii. We did anticipate observation and possible attacks by submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii and possibly on the line of communications from the islands to the West Coast. We anticipated possible raids, either by light forces or by submarines, on the outlying possessions at Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands.

49. Q. In drafting the dispatch of 27 November, was consideration given to the thought that mention of Western Pacific objectives only might tend to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area? A. I'm sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give such an impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would become involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.

50. Q. What action, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the dispatch of 27 November? A. Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war.

51. Q. When did the CNO receive a report, if any, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, concerning the action which he had taken in consequence of the dispatch of 27 November? A. Except that we had knowledge of the submarines who were on observation missions, I do not recall any reports of movements and I think this is correct because no departures for extended operations were necessary at that moment as long as we were not yet at war with Japan.

52. Q. Do you recall any curiosity within the offices of the CNO concerning the precautionary and security measures which Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was taking in and around Oahu? A. No.

53. Q. Do you know why the Commander-in-Chief was not called upon to report specifically what he was doing incident to the receipt of that dispatch? A. I think the reason that he was not called upon to inform us what he had done was because we had knowledge that submarines were out on missions of observation, that reenforcement of Wake and Midway were contemplated, and we believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time, were being continued.

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54. Q. In that understanding of the use of long-range aircraft in patrolling waters around Hawaii, what did you believe was being done at this particular time?

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A. We knew that the number of planes based on Oahu were not sufficient to maintain a complete 360 degree coverage at maximum range, twenty-four hours a day. Furthermore, the number of planes that were available could not have flown any such patrol without undue strain on the personnel and wearing out engines for which replacements were not available. Therefore, we knew that the coverage was by no means as complete as it should have been.

55. Q. Did the CNO inquire what security measures the Army forces on Oahu instituted at about this time, 27-28 November? A. I do not know unless he asked General Marshall in regard to it. I do not recall that I knew what security measures the Army was taking.

56. Q. I hand you two dispatches from the CNO, dated 26 November, which are Exhibits 12 and 13 in this record. They preceded the dispatch which contained the war warning by only a few hours. Do you recall hearing the thought expressed that injecting a matter of this comparatively minor importance, at a time when a war warning was sent, would tend to complicate the situation and unnecessarily detract the attention of the Commanders in Hawaii from the all-important subject of the imminence of war? A. These two dispatches were designed to reenforce the outlying stations at Midway and Wake. We were also concerned regarding security of Johnston Island and other United States islets in the Pacific. If anything, I think these dispatches should have accentuated the idea that these outlying positions were in danger of raids from Japanese light forces or from submarines rather than to allay suspicion of the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. These islands were important to us at that time as staging points for transferring planes to the Philippine Islands (which were routed by Midway, Wake, and Guam), and also for the staging of seaplanes to Australia for the British and Dutch.

57. Q. Do you recall any major discrepancy between the numbers of Army planes which were actually sent on across the Pacific and the estimate which Army authorities previously gave the Navy Department as to those numbers? A. No.

58. Q. Returning to those dispatches of 26 November, involving the movement of Army forces, either in relief of Marine units or as reenforcements thereto, in the outlying islands: was it not appreciated in the Offices of the CNO that the task amounted to entering into a rather major activity for the Commanders on Oahu? A. Yes.

59. Q. Did it not occur then that such a directive was a complicating matter? A. Complicating what?

60. Q. Complicating the situation for the Army and Navy Commanders in Oahu at a time when the relations with Japan were so badly strained. In other words, did it occur at the time that the directive was being issued somewhat too late?

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A. The Navy Department was concerned with the vulnerability of Wake and Midway and Johnston Islands, and it deemed it essential that these positions should be reenforced.

61. Q. I hand you a dispatch from the CNO, dated 28 November, which is Exhibit 9 in this record, and which in its latter part contains a directive. \[Home:488\] This dispatch went to Commander, Pacific Fleet, only as an information addressee-but contained a directive concerning offensive action. Can you explain what that particular phrase in the dispatch was meant to convey? A. This dispatch was addressed to the Commanders of the two Naval Coastal Frontiers on the West Coast of the continental United States. I do not recall that they had previously had any information specifically sent to them in regard to the gravity of the situation as regards Japan. This dispatch was intended to make them cognizant of the situation and was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, since these two Coastal Frontiers would come under his control once we were at war. The phrase "no offensive action" undoubtedly meant that they were to take no action against Japanese merchant vessels or Japanese submarines that might be within their waters unless these vessels had committed an overt act of war.

62. Q. I hand you an informatory dispatch sent out by CNO on 3 December '41, which is Exhibit 11 in this record. Do you recall any particular significance being attached to that information in the offices of the CNO? A. Yes. This indicated to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that war was imminent and was a matter of possibly a very few days or maybe hours.

63. Q. Did it change the opinions of such officers in the office of Naval Operations who might, before that time, have thought that the first Japanese aggressive move would not include us? A. It was the opinion, I believe, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that the first aggressive Japanese move would include us and this was only to emphasize all of the previous dispatches that war with Japan was imminent. The inclusion of Washington in this dispatch is conclusive evidence that such was the case.

64. Q. This examination contains no record of any directive, additional to that of 27 November, having been transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, up to 7 December. Do you recall any discussions in the office of Naval Operations during the ensuing period concerning the advisability of further directing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or of providing him with additional information? A. There may have been discussions of which I have now no particular recollection, but I'm quite certain that Admiral Stark considered that he had given the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequate warning that war with Japan was imminent.

65. Q. Did it occur to you, or to anyone else in the upper echelons of the Navy Department, that it would be well for some officer to fly out to Hawaii so that a meeting of minds would be better insured? A. I don't recall any discussion on that point. I think Admiral Stark thought that he had given both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic

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Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet every indication that war with Japan was imminent.

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not the CNO inquired concerning what was being done with the radar equipment in the hands of the Army on Oahu? A. As far as I know, he made no inquiry by dispatch. He may have asked General Marshall in regard to such matters and did not tell me, or if he did tell me, I have forgotten. I do not recall having any information that the Army's radar installations in Hawaii were not operating.

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67. Q. What as regards inquiry concerning the state of readiness of the Army pursuit aviation on Oahu? A. Again, I do not recall that any inquiry was made by dispatch; whether or not Admiral Stark discussed this matter with General Marshall, I do not know. I have no recollection of any information that I had that the Army air forces on Oahu were not ready to carry out their task in defending that naval base against attack.

68. Q. During November or December, '41, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report? A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 7 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States? A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

71. Q. Coming now to the events of the evening of 6 December, Washington time, when did you become cognizant of the receipt of a long thirteen or fourteen part Japanese dispatch which was picked up sometime on 6 December? A. I do not recall exactly when I saw it. I think I saw it after the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made.

72. Q. Admiral, during this crucial period, from October, '41, onward, was the "Atlantic war" so much in the Navy Department's picture as to amount to undue preoccupation on the part of the CNO and yourself? I mean in particular, were you able to give affairs in the Pacific theatre the time and thought that the situation merited? A. The undeclared war in the Atlantic had been going on for sometime. We were virtually at war with Germany, although the war was undeclared. We were escorting convoys and we were making preparations for the defense of our harbors, anticipating mining operations by German submarines. We had arranged for convoys anticipating attacks by German submarines on merchant vessels in the Western Atlantic. We were not particularly concerned regarding

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aircraft attacks, although a raid of one or two planes was a possibility on the Northern part of the Atlantic Coast. On the contrary, as to being preoccupied with the affairs in the Atlantic, we were far more concerned with the affairs in the Pacific than we were in the Atlantic. We felt that the war would be precipitated in the Pacific and that we would only become involved in the war in the Atlantic as the result of war in the Pacific. In addition to the testimony which I have given in regard to strengthening the positions in the Pacific, we had, for two months or more, taken steps to get our merchant vessels out of the Far East and out of the other areas in the Pacific where they could be captured by the Japanese. We began routing them far to the southard around Australia. The last vessels that went to the \[Home:430\] Philippines were convoyed; also we had initiated convoys in the Pacific for important cargoes going to Australia, including pilots for the Chinese air force and similar things. Answering the question definitely, the Atlantic situation did not preoccupy our attentions to the exclusion of the Pacific.

73. Q. Was the form and power of the attack made by the Japs on Pearl Harbor on 7 December received as a decided surprise to you? A. To me, it was. I expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be made against the Philippines and Guam with possibly raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to the westward of Hawaii, and submarine attacks against our shipping around Hawaii, between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States and possibly on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

74. Q. Sir, do you recall whether any of the other principal advisors to the Chief of Naval Operations estimated that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a probability? A. It is an historical fact that Japan started her war on China and Russia with surprise attacks before a declaration of war. We expected such attacks on the Philippines and on Guam without a declaration of war. I do not recall anyone in Operations representing to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness. The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning. The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:50 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.